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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Economic institutions, such as quality of contract enforcement, property rights, rule of law,
and the like, are increasingly viewed as key determinants of economic performance. While it
has been established that institutions are important in explaining income diﬀerences across
countries, what in turn explains those institutional diﬀerences is still an open question, both
theoretically and empirically.
In this paper we ask, how does opening to international trade aﬀect a country’s insti-
tutions? This is an important question because it is widely hoped that greater openness
will improve institutional quality through a variety of channels, including reducing rents,
creating constituencies for reform, and inducing specialization in sectors that demand good
institutions (Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian, 2005; IMF, 2005). While trade openness
does seem to be associated with better institutions in a cross-section of countries,1 in prac-
tice, however, the relationship between institutions and trade is likely to be much more
nuanced. In the 1700s, for example, the economies of the Caribbean were highly involved
in international trade, but trade expansion in that period coincided with the emergence
of slave societies and oligarchic regimes (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ, 2002, Rogozinski, 1999).
During the period 1880-1930, Central American economies and politics were dominated by
large fruit-exporting companies, which destabilized the political systems of the countries
in the region as they were jockeying to install regimes most favorable to their business
interests (Woodward, 1999). In the context of oil exporting countries, Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003) argue that trade in natural resources has a negative impact on growth
through worsening institutional quality rather than Dutch disease. The common feature of
these examples is that international trade contributed to concentration of political power
in the hands of groups that were interested in setting up, or perpetuating, bad institutions.
Thus, it is important to understand under what conditions greater trade openness results
in a deterioration of institutions, rather than their improvement.
The main goal of this paper is to provide a framework rich enough to incorporate both
positive and negative eﬀects of trade on institutions. We build a model in which institutional
quality is determined in a political economy equilibrium, and then compare outcomes in
autarky and trade. In particular, to address our main question, we bring together two
strands of the literature. The ﬁrst is the theory of trade in the presence of heterogeneous
ﬁrms (Melitz, 2003, Bernard et al., 2003). This literature argues that trade opening creates
1See, for example, Ades and Di Tella (1997), Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), and Rigobon and
Rodrik (2005).
2a separation between large ﬁrms that export, and smaller ones that do not. When countries
open to trade, the distribution of ﬁrm size becomes more unequal: the largest ﬁrms grow
larger through exporting, while smaller non-exporting ﬁrms shrink or disappear. Thus,
trade opening potentially leads to an economy dominated by a few large producers.
The second strand of the literature addresses ﬁrms’ preferences for institutional quality.
Increasingly, the view emerges that large ﬁrms are less aﬀected by bad institutions than
small and medium size ﬁrms.2 Furthermore, larger ﬁrms may actually prefer to make
institutions worse, ceteris paribus, in order to forestall entry and decrease competition in
both goods and factor markets.3 In our model, we formalize this eﬀect in a particularly
simple form. Finally, to connect the production structure of our model to the political
economy, we adopt the assumption that political power is positively related to economic
size: the larger the ﬁrm, the more political weight it has.
We identify two eﬀects through which trade aﬀects institutional quality. The ﬁrst is the
foreign competition eﬀect. The presence of foreign competition generally implies that each
ﬁrm would prefer better institutions under trade than in autarky. This is the disciplining
eﬀect of trade similar to Levchenko (2004). The second is the political power eﬀect. As
the largest ﬁrms become exporters and grow larger while the smaller ﬁrms shrink, political
power shifts in favor of big exporting ﬁrms. Because larger ﬁrms want institutions to be
worse, this eﬀect acts to lower institutional quality. The political power eﬀect drives the key
result of our paper. Trade opening can worsen institutions when it increases the political
power of a small elite of large exporters, who prefer to maintain bad institutions.
When is the political power eﬀect stronger than the foreign competition eﬀect? Our
comparative statics show that when a country captures only a small share of world produc-
tion in the rent-bearing industry, or if it is relatively large, the foreign competition eﬀect
of trade predominates. Thus, while the power does shift to larger ﬁrms, these ﬁrms still
prefer to improve institutions after trade opening. On the opposite end, institutions are
most likely to deteriorate when the country is small relative to the rest of the world, but
captures a relatively large share of world trade in the rent-bearing industry. Intuitively, if
a country produces most of the world’s supply of the rent-bearing good, the foreign compe-
tition eﬀect will be weakest. On the other hand, having a large trading partner allows the
largest exporting ﬁrms to grow unchecked relative to domestic GDP, giving them a great
2For example, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) ﬁnd that bad institutions have a greater
negative impact on growth of small ﬁrms than large ﬁrms.
3This view is taken, for example, by Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 2003b). These authors argue that
ﬁnancial development languished in the interwar period and beyond partly because large corporations wanted
to restrict access to external ﬁnance by smaller ﬁrms in order to reduce competition.
3deal of political power. We believe our framework can help explain why, contrary to expec-
tations, more trade sometimes fails to have a disciplining eﬀect and improve institutional
quality. Indeed, our comparative statics are suggestive of the experience of the Caribbean
in the 18th century, or Central America in the late 19th-early 20th: these were indeed small
economies that had much larger trading partners, and captured large shares of world trade
in their respective exports. At the end of the paper, we describe in detail three cases that we
believe our model captures well: the Caribbean sugar boom in the 18th century; the coﬀee
boom in Latin America in the 19th; and the cotton and cattle boom in Central America in
the mid-20th century.
Our environment is a simpliﬁed version of the Melitz (2003) model of monopolistic
competition with heterogeneous producers. Firms diﬀer in their productivity, face ﬁxed
costs to production and foreign trade, and have some market power. If the domestic variable
proﬁts cover the ﬁxed costs of production, the ﬁrm enters. If the variable proﬁts from serving
the export market are greater than the export-related ﬁxed cost, the ﬁrm exports. Variable
proﬁts depend on ﬁrm productivity, and thus in this economy only the most productive
ﬁrms export. Melitz (2003) shows that when a country opens, access to foreign markets
allows the most productive ﬁrms to grow to a size that would not have been possible in
autarky. At the same time, increased competition in the domestic markets reduces the size
of domestic ﬁrms and their proﬁts. The distribution of proﬁts thus becomes more unequal
than it was in autarky: larger ﬁrms grow larger, while smaller ﬁrms become smaller or
disappear under trade.
The institutional quality parameter in our model is the ﬁxed cost of production. When
this cost is high, institutions are bad, and fewer ﬁrms can operate. Narrowly, this ﬁxed cost
can be interpreted as a bureaucratic or corruption-related cost of starting and operating a
business.4 More broadly, it can be a reduced-form way of modeling any impediment to doing
business that would prevent some ﬁrms from entering or producing eﬃciently. For example,
it could be a cost of establishing formal property rights over land or other assets. Or, in
the Rajan and Zingales (2003a) view of the role of ﬁnancial development, our institutional
quality parameter can be thought of as a prohibitive cost of external ﬁnance.
In our model, every producer has to pay the same ﬁxed cost. We ﬁrst illustrate how
preferences over institutional quality depend on ﬁrm size. We show that each producer
has an optimal level of the ﬁxed cost, which increases with ﬁrm productivity: the larger
4For example, Djankov et al. (2002) document large diﬀerences in the amount of time and money it
requires to start a business in a large sample of countries.
4the ﬁrm, the worse it wants institutions to be. Why wouldn’t everyone prefer the lowest
possible ﬁxed cost? On the one hand, a higher ﬁx e dc o s tt h a taﬁrm must pay decreases
proﬁts one for one, and same for everyone. On the other hand, setting a higher ﬁxed cost
prevents entry by the lowest-productivity ﬁrms, which reduces competition and increases
proﬁts. This second eﬀect is more pronounced the higher is a ﬁrm’s productivity. More
productive ﬁrms would thus prefer to set ﬁxed costs higher.
As a last step in characterizing our model environment, we require a political economy
mechanism through which institutional quality is determined. The key assumption we make
here is that the larger is the size of a ﬁrm, the greater its political inﬂuence. There is a
body of evidence that individuals with higher incomes participate more in the political
process (Benabou, 2000). There is also evidence that larger ﬁrms engage more in lobbying
activity (see, for example, Bombardini, 2004). We adopt the political economy framework
of Benabou (2000), which modiﬁes the median voter model to give wealthier agents a higher
voting weight. These ingredients are enough to characterize the autarky and trade equilibria.
Firms decide on the ﬁxed costs of production common to all, a decision process in which
larger ﬁrms receive a larger weight. Then, production takes place and goods markets clear.
We use this framework to compare equilibrium institutions under autarky and trade, in
order to illustrate the eﬀects of opening that we discussed above.
Our paper is closely related to several contributions to the literature on trade and insti-
tutions. In an important early work, Krueger (1974) argues that when openness to interna-
tional trade is combined with a particular form of trade policy — quantitative restrictions —
agents in the economy will compete over rents that arise from possessing an import license.
In this setting, one of the manifestations of rent seeking will be greater use of bribery and
thus corruption. Other papers have explored the eﬀects of trade on institutions unrelated
to distortionary trade policy. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) argue
that in some West European countries during the period 1500-1850, Atlantic trade engen-
dered good institutions by creating a merchant class interested in establishing a system of
enforceable contracts. Thus, trade expansion aﬀected institutions by creating a powerful
lobby for institutional improvement. Levchenko (2004) argues that trade opening changes
agents’ preferences in favor of better institutions. When bad institutions exist because they
enable some agents to extract rents, trade opening can reduce those rents. In this case,
trade leads to institutional improvement by lowering the incentive to lobby for bad institu-
tions. Our model exhibits both the foreign competition eﬀect related to Levchenko (2004),
and the political power eﬀect of Acemoglu et al. (2005). However, in our framework, the
5more powerful groups need not favor better institutions under trade.
In focusing on the interaction of trade and domestic political economy, our paper is
related to Bardhan (2003) and Verdier (2005). These authors suggest that trade may shift
domestic political power in such a way as to prevent eﬃcient or equitable redistribution.
Finally, our work is also related to the literature on the political economy dimension of the
natural resource curse. It has been argued that the presence of natural resources lowers
growth through worsening institutions. This is because competition between groups for
access to natural resource-related rents leads to voracity eﬀects along the lines of Tornell
and Lane (1999) (see also the discussion in Isham et al., 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes preferences, production
structure, and the autarky and trade equilibria. Section 3 lays out the political economy
setup and characterizes the political economy equilibria under autarky and trade. Section 4
presents the main result of the paper, which is a comparison between the autarky and trade
equilibria. We start with an analytic discussion of the conditions under which institutions
may deteriorate with trade opening. Then, we present the results of a numerical simulation
of the model, and use it to discuss the comparative statics. Section 5 presents three case
studies, in which we believe that the mechanisms described by our model were at work.
Section 6 concludes. Proofs of Propositions are collected in the Appendix.
2 Goods and Factor Market Equilibrium
2.1 The Environment5
Consider an economy with two sectors. One of the sectors produces a homogeneous good
z, while the other sector produces a continuum of diﬀerentiated goods x(v).C o n s u m e r
preferences over the two products are deﬁned by the utility function
















5Our notation is borrowed from Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003).
6∀v ∈ V ,w h e r eε =1 /(1−α) > 1, and we deﬁne A ≡ βE/
R
v∈V p(v)1−εdv to be the demand
shift parameter that each producer takes as given.
There is one factor of production, labor (L). The homogeneous good z is produced with
a linear technology that requires one unit of L to produce one unit of z.W en o r m a l i z et h e
price of z, and therefore the wage, to 1.
There is a ﬁxed mass n of the diﬀerentiated goods ﬁrms, each of whom is able to
produce a unique variety of good x. Firms in this sector have heterogeneous productivity.
In particular, each ﬁrm is characterized by a marginal cost parameter a, which is the number
of units of L that the ﬁrm needs to employ in order to produce one unit of good x.E a c h
ﬁrm with marginal cost a is free not to produce. If it does decide to produce, it must
pay a ﬁxed cost f common across ﬁrms, and a marginal cost equal to a.T h e ﬁrm then
faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its unique variety, given by (2). As is well-
known, isoelastic demand gives rise to a constant markup over marginal cost. The ﬁrm










The distribution of a across agents is characterized by the cumulative distribution func-
tion G(a). In order to adapt our model to a political economy framework in the later
sections, we need to obtain closed-form solutions in the goods and factor market equilib-
rium. We follow Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and use the Pareto distribution for
productivity. The Pareto distribution seems to approximate well the distribution of ﬁrm
size in the US economy, and delivers a closed-form solution of the model. In the Appendix,
we describe it in detail, and present solutions to the autarky and trade equilibria when G(a)
is Pareto.
2.2 Autarky
To pin down the equilibrium production structure, we need to ﬁnd the cutoﬀ l e v e lo fm a r -
ginal cost, aA, such that all ﬁrms above this marginal cost decide not to produce. In this
model, ﬁrm productivity takes values on the interval (0, 1
b]. The following assumption on
the parameter values ensures that the least productive ﬁrm does not operate in equilibrium,
and thus the equilibrium is interior:
f>
(1 − α)β [k − (ε − 1)]L
nk
£
1 − (1 − α)β ε−1
k
¤ .





w h e r ew ed e ﬁne V (y) ≡
R y
0 a1−εdG(a).6 The ﬁrm with productivity aA makes zero proﬁt




A = f. (5)
The equilibrium value of E can be pinned down by imposing the goods market clearing
condition that expenditure must equal income:




W ed on o th a v ef r e ee n t r yi nt h em o d e l ,t h a ti s ,w eh a v eaﬁxed mass of producers. This
means that total income, given by the equation above, is the sum of total labor income
and the proﬁts accruing to all ﬁrms in the economy.7 We can use (3) and (5) to write this
condition as:8
E = L − nf
£
aε−1
A V (aA) − G(aA)
¤
. (6)
The two equations (5) and (6) in two unknowns E and aA characterize the autarky
equilibrium in this economy, which we illustrate in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis is a,
which is the ﬁrm’s marginal cost parameter (thus, the most productive ﬁrms are closest
to zero). On the vertical axis is ﬁrm proﬁt. The zero proﬁtc u t o ﬀ, aA,i sd e ﬁn e db yt h e
intersection of the proﬁt curve with the horizontal axis. All ﬁrms with marginal cost higher
than aA don’t produce. For the producing ﬁrms, proﬁt increases in productivity. Higher f
means that in equilibrium fewer ﬁrms operate: daA
df < 0. That is, the higher is f,t h em o r e
productive a ﬁrm needs to be in order to survive. Bad institutions deter entry by the less
productive agents.
6It turns out that in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition and CES utility, the integral
V (y) is useful for writing the price indices and the total proﬁts in the economy where the distribution of
a is G(a).E a c hﬁrm with productivity a sets the price of a/α. Since only ﬁrms with marginal cost below










α1−εV (aA), leading to equation (4).
7The framework we use diﬀers from the traditional Krugman-Melitz setup, in which there is an inﬁnite
number of potential entrepreneurs and free entry, and thus there are no pure proﬁts in equilibrium. Our
choice of keeping the mass of producers ﬁxed is dictated by the need to adapt the model to the political
economy setup. In our version of the model, all the conclusions are the same as in the more traditional
Melitz framework with free entry, when it comes to the eﬀects of trade.
8Using the expression for proﬁts (3), and the zero cutoﬀ proﬁt condition (5), we can express the proﬁto f
a ﬁrm with marginal cost a as: π(a)=f(a
ε−1
A a
1−ε − 1). Integrating the total proﬁts for all a ≤ aA yields
equation (6).
82.3 Trade
Suppose that there are two countries, the North (N)a n dt h eS o u t h( S), each characterized
by a production structure described above. The countries are endowed with quantities LN
and LS of labor, respectively, and populated by mass nN and nS entrepreneurs. Let fS be
the ﬁxed cost of production in the South, and fN in the North.
Good x can be traded, but trade is subject to both ﬁxed and per unit costs.9 In
particular, in order to export, a producer of good x must pay a ﬁxed cost fX,a n dap e r -
unit iceberg cost τ. We assume that these trade costs are the same for the two countries.
A ﬁrm in country i that produces a variety v faces domestic demand given by
xi(v)=Aip(v)−ε, (7)
where Ai ≡ βEi/
R
vi∈V i p(v)1−εdv is the size of domestic demand, i = N,S.N o t e t h a t
the denominator aggregates prices of all varieties of x consumed in country i, including
imported foreign varieties. A ﬁrm with marginal cost a serving the domestic market in
country i maximizes proﬁt by setting the price equal to p(v)=a/α, and its resulting







for i = N,S.
If the ﬁrm with marginal cost a decides to pay the ﬁxed cost of exporting, its eﬀective
marginal cost of serving the foreign market is τa, and thus it sets the foreign price equal to







where j 6= i designates the partner country, and i = N,S.
What determines whether or not a ﬁrm decides to export? A ﬁrm cannot export without
ﬁrst paying the ﬁxed cost of production fi. We also assume that τ and fX are large enough
that not all ﬁrms which ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce domestically ﬁnd it worthwhile to
export. Thus, only the higher-productivity ﬁrms end up exporting, which seems to be the
case empirically. We illustrate the partition of ﬁrms into domestic and exporting in Figure
2. The two lines plot the domestic and export proﬁts as a function of a.A sd r a w n ,ﬁrms
with marginal cost higher than aD do not produce at all. Firms with marginal cost between
9For the sake of tractability, we assume that z can be traded costlessly. This simpliﬁes the analysis
because as long as both countries produce some z, wages are equalized in the two countries.
9aX and aD produce only for the domestic market, while the rest of the ﬁrms serve both the
domestic and export markets.
To pin down the equilibrium, we must ﬁnd the production cutoﬀs ai
D, and the exporting
cutoﬀs ai
X, for the two countries i = N,S. Similarly to the autarky case, given these cutoﬀs,








where i = N,S,a n dj 6= i. Comparing these to the autarky demand (4), we see that the
denominators in these expressions reﬂect the fact that some varieties of good x consumed






















where i = N,S,a n dj 6= i. The model can be closed by imposing the condition that
expenditure equals income in both countries. In particular, total income is the sum of labor
income and all proﬁts accruing to ﬁrms from selling in the domestic and export markets:























Using the expressions for proﬁts in the two countries, (8) and (9), these can be rearranged
to give two equations in ES and EN:11





























10Each ﬁrm with productivity a serving the domestic market sets the price of a/α. Foreign ﬁrms set the
price τa/α. In the South, only ﬁrms with marginal cost below a
S
D operate in equilibrium, and only Northern
ﬁrms with marginal cost below a
N




























11Using the expressions for proﬁts, (8), (9), and the zero cutoﬀ proﬁt conditions (11), (12), we can express



















if it exports. Integrating the total proﬁts yields equation (13).




X, ES,a n dEN.
How does the trade equilibrium diﬀer from the autarky equilibrium for given levels of fi?
For the political economy eﬀects we wish to illustrate, the most important feature of the
trade equilibrium is that only the most productive ﬁrms export and grow as a result of trade
opening. Under certain parameter restrictions, this model has the features of the Melitz
(2003) framework which we will use in discussing how trade aﬀects institutions. The exact
nature of the restrictions is detailed in the appendix (section A.2.) and will be henceforth
implicit. Comparing autarky and trade, the following results hold: i) ai
A ≥ ai
D:h i g h e r
productivity is required to begin operating in the domestic market under trade than in
autarky; ii) for ﬁrms that operate under trade, πi
D <π i
A:p r o ﬁts from domestic sales are
lower under trade than in autarky. This implies, for instance, that ﬁrms which do not
export in the trade equilibrium face lower total proﬁts under trade. And, iii) there exists
ac u t o ﬀ ai
π <a i




A). Notice that simply being an export ﬁrm is not suﬃcient to conclude
that total proﬁts increase with trade, because of lower proﬁts from domestic sales and ﬁxed
costs to be incurred in order to export. Thus, when countries open to trade, the least
productive ﬁrms drop out, ﬁrms with intermediate productivity suﬀer a decrease in total
proﬁts, and the most productive ﬁrms experience an increase in proﬁt. The distribution of
proﬁts becomes more unequal under trade.
3 Political Economy
In this paper, we think of the ﬁxed cost of production, f, as the parameter that captures
institutional quality. It can be interpreted narrowly as a corruption cost of starting or
operating a business, or more broadly as any eﬀect of poor institutions that acts to re-
strict entry. The quality of institutions, f, is determined endogenously through a political
economy mechanism in which entrepreneurs participate; for simplicity we abstract from the
participation of L in the political process. In order to characterize the equilibrium outcome,
we need to specify the agents’ preferences, and the political economy mechanism through
which institutional quality is determined. In our framework, preferences are equated with
agents’ wealth, and wealthier agents prefer to have worse institutions. For this, the con-
nection to the production side of the model is essential. As we show below, when a ﬁrm’s
wealth is a positively related to its proﬁts, it is indeed the case that larger ﬁrms prefer worse
institutions.
When it comes to the political economy mechanism, the eﬀect we would like to capture
11is that agents with higher incomes have a higher weight in the policy decision. For instance,
Bombardini (2004) documents that larger ﬁrms are more involved in lobbying activity, and
thus we would expect them to have a higher weight in the determination of policies. Rather
than assuming a speciﬁc bargaining game, we adopt a reduced-form approach of Benabou
(2000). This approach modiﬁes the basic median voter setup to allow for a connection
between income and the eﬀective number of votes.
This section provides a general characterization of the political economy environment.
We state the regularity conditions that must apply in our setting, deﬁne an equilibrium,
and then prove a set of propositions showing its existence and stability. We then apply the
general results to the case in which agents’ preferences and voting weights come from the
ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the autarky and trade equilibria. Finally, we present the main result of the
paper, which is the comparison between the autarky and trade equilibrium institutions.
3.1 The Setup
Firms participate in a political game as an outcome of which the level of barriers f ∈ [fL,f H]
is determined.12 An agent is characterized by a political weight, λ(w), which is a function
of the agent’s wealth w. We assume that the political weight function λ(w) is identical for
every agent, and takes the following form:
λ(w)=λ0 + wλ1.
For a given distribution of wealth F (.), the pivotal voter is characterized by a level of



















dF (w) < ∞.
The parameter λ1 can thus be seen as the wealth bias of the political system. Higher
values of λ1 give more political power to richer individuals, while λ1 =0yields the median
voter outcome, which we denote by wm. It is then straightforward to see that for every
possible political weight proﬁle, the associated pivotal voter is always wealthier than the
median voter as long as λ1 > 0. The following Lemma characterizes pivotal voters at
diﬀerent levels of λ0 and λ1.
Lemma 1 Deﬁning by wp (λ0,λ 1) the pivotal voter that prevails when the political weight
schedule is λ(w)=λ0 + wλ1, the following properties hold:
12As will become clear below, we must restrict the quality of institutions, f, to a bounded interval in order
to ensure that an equilibrium exists.
12• wp (λ0,λ 1) is increasing in λ1 and decreasing in λ0;
• wp (λ0,λ 1) ≥ wm for any λ0 > 0,λ 1 ≥ 0;
• limλ0→∞ wp (λ0,λ 1)=wm.¥
For the rest of the paper, we assume that wealth is derived from proﬁts, so that for any





, it can be expressed as wr (a,f),w h e r er = A,T refers
to a particular regime that occurs in the economy, that is, autarky or trade. We must put
a set of regularity conditions on the function wr (a,f) in order to ensure that the political
economy equilibrium is well-behaved. We detail these conditions formally in the Appendix.
Aside from the usual assumptions about twice—continuous—diﬀerentiability with respect to
a and f, we assume that the marginal impact of an increase in f on wealth, ∂wr (a,f)/∂f is
decreasing in f (concavity), but also decreasing in a: more productive entrepreneurs suﬀer
relatively less from higher barriers to entry than their less productive counterparts do.
We now discuss the two ingredients necessary to ﬁnd a political economy equilibrium:
we need to know the identity of the pivotal voter, given by the marginal cost p,a n dw e
need to know what institutions that pivotal voter prefers. We start with the latter.
3.2 The Preference Curve





× [fL,f H] such that f is
the preferred level of entry barriers of an entrepreneur with marginal cost p.W ed e n o t et h e
Preference Curve by fr (p). We make the simplifying assumption that for all entrepreneurs,
the preferred level of f is simply the one that maximizes their wealth.
Proposition 2 When regularity conditions (A.6) through (A.10) are satisﬁed, there exist
two thresholds f−1






,s u c ht h a tt h eP r e f e r e n c eC u r v ei saw e l l -
















fL if p ≥ f−1
r (fL)
Furthermore, the Preference Curve fr (p) is nonincreasing, and strictly decreasing for some
values of p.¥
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition shows that when the wealth-maximizing level of f
is interior, it can be obtained simply by taking the ﬁrst-order condition of wealth with
13respect to f. When the proﬁt-maximizing level of f is not interior, the entrepreneur prefers
either fH or fL, and all entrepreneurs that are more (less) productive also prefer fH (fL).
The second part states that wealthier agents prefer worse institutions. The non-standard
assumption driving the latter result is that ∂wr (a,f)/∂f is decreasing in a:t h em a r g i n a l
beneﬁts of raising entry barriers must be higher for higher productivity agents. Then, higher
marginal cost entrepreneurs prefer lower levels of entry barriers, all else equal.
Let us now make the connection between the goods market equilibrium outcomes and





P(f) if a ≤ aA (f)








PS(f) if a ≤ aX (f)
πD(a,f)
PS(f) if a ∈ [aX (f),a D (f)]
0 if a ≥ aD (f)
(17)
under trade, where P (f) and PS (f) are consumption-based price indices in autarky and
under trade in the South, respectively. That is, agents’ wealth is simply real proﬁts.
Corollary 3 When wr (a,f) is given by (16) or (17), it satisﬁes regularity conditions (A.6)
through (A.10). Thus, both autarky and trade regimes are characterized by downward sloping
Preference Curves.¥
Why would any producer prefer to set f at any level higher than fL?T h eﬁxed cost f
aﬀects real wealth through three channels. The ﬁrst two have to do with nominal proﬁts.
The key trade-oﬀ is that while a higher level of ﬁxed cost has a direct eﬀect on every ﬁrm’s
nominal proﬁts, a higher f also leads to less entry. With fewer producers operating in the
economy, the active ﬁrms’ variable proﬁts are higher. Most importantly, this second eﬀect
is more pronounced for higher productivity ﬁrms, which implies that the more productive
ﬁrms prefer to live with worse institutions. The third eﬀect has to do with the price level. A
higher value of f leads to fewer producers, and thus fewer varieties and a higher consumption












k e e p i n gi nm i n dt h a tP, E and aA are equilibrium values that are themselves functions of
f.T h eﬁrst term in the numerator is the variable proﬁt s .I ti st r u et h a tr a i s i n gf lowers
14the total proﬁts one for one, because the ﬁrm must pay higher ﬁxed costs. However, raising
f also raises the nominal variable proﬁts, because it pushes more ﬁrms out of production.
Furthermore, variable proﬁts are multiplicative in a1−ε, a term that rises and falls with the
ﬁrm’s productivity. Thus, a ﬁrm with a higher productivity will reach maximum nominal
proﬁts at higher levels of f. In the Appendix (section A.4), we use the closed-form solutions
of the model to show under what conditions this eﬀect dominates the other two, and more
productive ﬁrms indeed prefer worse institutions. It turns out that without the price level
eﬀect it is always the case that more productive ﬁrms prefer worse institutions. The price
level eﬀect, in turn, can be made weak enough not to overturn this pattern by lowering β,
the share of the diﬀerentiated good CES composite, in the total consumption basket.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this Proposition. Figure 3 reproduces Figure 1 for two diﬀerent
levels of f.W ec a ns e et h a tr a i s i n gf forces the least productive ﬁrms to drop out. Further-
more, the slope of the proﬁt line is higher in absolute value for higher f:v a r i a b l ep r o ﬁts are
higher at each productivity. Thus, ﬁrms above a certain productivity cutoﬀ actually prefer
ah i g h e rf, as the variable proﬁte ﬀect is stronger than the ﬁxed cost eﬀect. To illustrate
this point further, Figure 4 plots the proﬁts of two ﬁrms as a function of f. The proﬁts
of each ﬁrm are non-monotonic in f, ﬁrst increasing, then decreasing in it. A ﬁrm with a
higher productivity attains maximum proﬁts at a higher level of f. This heterogeneity in
ﬁrm preferences over institutions is the key feature of our analysis.
In the trade equilibrium, ﬁrms’ preferences over institutional quality diﬀer from those in
autarky. This is because the level of f in the domestic economy aﬀects both the domestic
production and the pattern of its imports. Nonetheless, the essential trade-oﬀ remains
unchanged. On the one hand, a higher f implies higher variable proﬁts, an eﬀect that is
stronger for more productive ﬁrms. On the other, the higher ﬁxed cost decreases proﬁts one
for one, and pushes the consumption price level up. Comparing to autarky, we must keep
in mind that f may also aﬀect the ﬁrms’ decision whether or not to export, and its proﬁts
from exporting.
Having completed our description of ﬁrms’ preferences, we now move to a discussion of
the political economy mechanism.
3.3 The Political Curve





× [fL,f H],w h e r ep is the
marginal cost of the pivotal voter in the economy characterized by the ﬁxed cost equal to
















when the pivotal voter thus deﬁned is unique for every f.H e r ew ee x p r e s st h ei d e n t i t yo f
the pivotal voter in terms of marginal cost a rather than wealth w. Furthermore, we would
like to equate wealth with proﬁts in our analysis. In this formulation, for a unique mapping
between wealth and productivity of the pivotal voter to exist, we must ensure that the
pivotal voter always produces under autarky and under trade. In what follows, we assume
that parameter values are such that this condition is always met. This can be achieved by
either a low enough fH or a high enough λ1.




0 ∀f ∈ [fL,f H], the Political Curve given implicitly by (19) is a well-deﬁned and piecewise
continuously diﬀerentiable function of f. Furthermore, the Political Curve is downward
sloping almost everywhere.¥
The ﬁrst part of this Proposition formally establishes the equivalence between deﬁning a
pivotal voter by her wealth and by her marginal cost of production. This result comes from
the assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between wealth and marginal
cost in the neighborhood of any potential pivotal voter. We can hence restate previous
results in terms of marginal cost of production a rather than wealth, keeping in mind that
the mapping between the two is decreasing.
The second part of the Proposition takes one extra step in characterizing the Political
Curve. In particular, we would like to show that under certain conditions, the Political
Curve is downward sloping. That is, we would like to restrict attention to cases in which a
higher level of ﬁxed cost results in a pivotal voter that is more productive. This is a sensible
requirement: a higher level of f decreases the wealth of the least productive ﬁrms, and
increases the wealth of the most productive ﬁrms, thus shifting the voting weight towards
the higher productivity ﬁrms. We illustrate this in Figure 5, which plots the densities of
proﬁts for two values of ﬁxed cost, fh >f l. Nonetheless, for this Proposition to hold, certain
restrictions on the function λ(w) must be satisﬁe d :i tm u s tg i v ee n o u g hw e i g h tt ow e a l t h i e r
agents relative to less wealthy ones.
3.4 Equilibrium: Deﬁn i t i o n ,E x i s t e n c e ,C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n
We now deﬁne the equilibrium that results from the agents’ preferences and the voting. As
the discussion above makes clear, there is a two-way dependence in our setup: the identity
16of the pivotal ﬁrm, p, depends on the level of f, while the level of f depends on the identity
of the pivotal ﬁrm. Our equilibrium must thus be a ﬁxed point.
Deﬁnition 5 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium of the economy is a pair (fr,p r) such that






Proposition 6 There exists at least one equilibrium.¥
Given our characterization of the Preference Curve and the Political Curve above, the
deﬁnition of equilibrium and its existence can be illustrated with the help of Figure 6. The
proof of this Proposition shows that one of three cases are possible: fL,f H, or an interior
value of f.T h e ﬁrst two occur when the two curves intersect on the ﬂat portion of the
Preference Curve.
Having established existence, we now would like to characterize potential equilibria. We
will not consider an explicitly dynamic setting to address issues of stability. We instead
deﬁne the following functions: ∀f ∈ [fL,f H],
Φr (f)=fr [pr (f)]
and by induction, for n ≥ 1,
Φ0













Πr (p)=pr [fr (p)]
and for any n ≥ 1,
Π0







Deﬁnition 7 (Stability) An equilibrium (fr,p r) is stable if there exists ρ>0, such that
for any η>0, there exists an integer ν ≥ 1 such that for any n ≥ ν, ˜ p ∈ (pr − ρ,pr + ρ),
and ˜ f ∈ (fr − ρ,fr + ρ),
|Πn







¯ ¯ ¯ <η . (23)
In other words, an equilibrium will be considered stable if, after a small perturbation (of
size ρ) around the equilibrium point, the system converges back to the equilibrium, with (20)
17and (21) characterizing the dynamic process. The deﬁnition of stability above corresponds
to the concept of asymptotic stability in dynamic processes. Two generic cases of equilibria
that violate the stability requirement that might arise are: (i) a “cycling” case, whereby the
process is bounded but does not converge; (ii) the process diverges after a perturbation and
reaches a corner solution. We prove the following proposition by considering these two cases.
We ﬁrst argue that cycling cannot occur as Preference and Political curves are downward
sloping, and then establish that if there does not exist any stable interior equilibrium, then
one of the two corners is an equilibrium, and corner equilibria are stable.
Proposition 8 There exists a stable equilibrium.¥
We can now apply the results proved in this section to the autarky and trade regimes.
When wealth equals proﬁts, and is thus deﬁned by (16) and (17) in autarky and trade
respectively, we have the following result:
Corollary 9 Under regularity conditions, both autarky and trade regimes are characterized
by downward sloping Preference and Political Curves. Furthermore there exists a stable
equilibrium in both autarky and trade regimes.¥
4 Institutions in Autarky and Trade
We now compare the equilibrium institutions in the South that occur under autarky and
trade. All throughout, we assume that the North’s institutions are exogenously given, and
all the adjustment in the North takes place on the production side. When an economy
opens to trade, both the Preference Curve and the Political Curve shift. We investigate the
behavior of Political and Preference Curves in turn.
4.1 The Political Power Eﬀect
The reorganization of production due to trade opening leads the Political Curve to shift
“inwards.” In particular, at any f, the most productive ﬁrms begin exporting, and the distri-
bution of proﬁts becomes more unequal: relative wealth shifts towards the more productive
ﬁrms. This means that the pivotal voter moves to the left, pT(f) ≤ pA(f) ∀f ∈ [fL,f H].
We label this the political power eﬀect: the power shifts towards larger ﬁrms under trade
compared to autarky. Once again, while the notion that increased proﬁt inequality leads the
pivotal voter to shift in this direction is intuitive, the proof depends crucially on regularity
conditions governing λ(w): the political weight function must be suﬃciently increasing in
wealth.
18Proposition 10 Under regularity conditions on λ(w), the Pivotal Voter curve moves in-
ward as the economy opens to trade.¥
4.2 The Foreign Competition Eﬀect
We now need to make a statement about how the Preference Curve shifts. It turns out
that for most parameter values, and for values of a high enough, a ﬁrm at a given level of
a prefers to have better institutions under trade than in autarky. This very much related
to the Melitz eﬀect, and comes from the fact that domestic proﬁts are lower under trade
due to the increased foreign competition.13 We label this inward shift of the Preference
Curve the foreign competition eﬀect. We must keep in mind that the most productive of
the exporting ﬁrms may actually prefer worse institutions under trade, because as we saw
above, export proﬁts increase in f. It is also true that in principle, parameter values may
exist under which the inward shift of the Preference Curve does not occur. This would
happen, for example, is nN
nS is suﬃciently low.14 When that is the case, the inward shift of
the Political Curve unambiguously predicts a worsening of institutions as a result of trade.
Otherwise, the two eﬀects conﬂict with each other.
4.3 Comparing Institutions in Autarky and under Trade
In comparing the equilibria resulting under trade and autarky, we face the potential diﬃculty
that the trade equilibrium may not be unique. Thus we must deﬁne an equilibrium selection
process. We assume that the equilibrium resulting from trade opening is the one to whose
basin of attraction the autarky equilibrium fA belongs. To do so, we must deﬁne a basin
of attraction with respect to f.
Deﬁnition 11 The basin of attraction of a stable equilibrium (fT,p T) is denoted B (fT)
and is deﬁned as
B (fT)={f ∈ [fL,f H], ∀η>0,∃ν>1,∀n>ν ,|Φn (f) − fT| <η }.
We now show that there exist parameter values under which the transition from autarky
to trade implies a worsening of institutions.
13See conditions (A.12) and (A.13) in section A.2. of the Appendix.
14In the most extreme case, suppose that there are no producers of the diﬀerentiated good in the North:
nN =0 . Then, clearly, there is no reason for the foreign competition eﬀect to occur, because there is no
foreign competition in that sector.
19Proposition 12 Consider an interior and stable autarky equilibrium (fA,p A).I fpT (fA) <
f−1
T (fA), then there exists an equilibrium of the economy under trade (fT,p T) such that
fA ∈ B (fT) and fA <f T.¥
The above Proposition shows that if the political power eﬀect is large enough com-
pared to the foreign competition eﬀect, the economy will converge towards an equilibrium
with worsening institutions. In order to compare the foreign competition and political
power eﬀects, let’s compare the pivotal voter under trade starting from autarky institu-
tions, pT (fA), and the entrepreneur who prefers fA under the trade regime, f−1
T (fA).I f
pT (fA) <f −1
T (fA), then the political power eﬀect is stronger than the competition eﬀect.










It is positive if and only if pT (fA) <f −1
T (fA).15 We can use the autarky pivotal voter to















The ﬁrst part of this expression represents the magnitude of the Political Power curve shift.
It is positive, because pT (fA) <p A (fA). The second term proxies for the strength of the
foreign competition eﬀe c t .I tw i l lb el a r g ei na b s o l u t ev a l u ew h e nt h e r ei sal a r g ed i ﬀerence
between pA (fA) and f−1
T (fA): agents’ preferences change strongly between autarky and
trade. Note that if the integral of the second term is negative, ∆ > 0 unambiguously: the
two eﬀects reinforce each other, and institutions deteriorate. When foreign competition
changes preferences in favor of better institutions, the two eﬀects act in opposite directions.
We present the two cases graphically in Figure 7, starting from the same interior au-
tarky equilibrium. The ﬁrst panel illustrates a transition to a trade equilibrium in which
institutions improve as a result of trade. For this to occur, the shift in the Political Curve
must be suﬃciently small, and the shift i nt h eP r e f e r e n c eC u r v es u ﬃciently large. The
former would occur, for example, if the function λ(w) was ﬂat enough. The latter would
occur if the foreign competition eﬀect is suﬃciently pronounced, that is, when nN is large
enough relative to nS. The second panel illustrates a case in which institutions deteriorate
15Note that when pT (fA)=f
−1
T (fA), ∆ =0 ,a spT (fA) is the pivotal voter.
20as a result of trade. If the political power eﬀect is strong enough, or the foreign competition
eﬀect is weak enough, institutions will worsen.
What are the conditions under which the two diﬀerent scenarios are more likely to
prevail? The model does not oﬀer an analytical solution with which we could perform com-
parative statics with pencil and paper, due to both the algebraic complexity of the trade
side of the model, and the fact that we cannot ﬁnd closed-form expressions for the pivotal
ﬁrm. Nonetheless, we can implement the solution numerically in a fairly straightforward
manner. In order to focus especially on the South’s market power and the resulting mag-
nitude of the foreign competition eﬀect, we compare changes in institutions for a grid of
parameter values. Starting from an interior autarky equilibrium, we check how it changes
in response to trade opening for a grid of LN’s and nN’s.16
The results are illustrated in Figure 8. It depicts ranges of LS/LN and nS/nN for which
institutions improve and deteriorate as a result of opening. The shaded area represents
parameter values under which institutions deteriorate. Trade is most likely to lead to a
deterioration when the economy is both small in size (LN is large compared to LS), and
captures a large share of world trade in the diﬀerentiated good (that is, nS is large relative
to nN). Under these conditions, there is a large movement in the pivotal voter, while the
movement in the Preference Curve is small, or can even be positive — that is, some range of
ﬁrms may want worse institutions under trade than in autarky in some cases. Intuitively,
when there are relatively few producers of the competing good in the North (nN is low),
the disciplining eﬀect of opening up to foreign competition will be weak. On the other
hand, when the size of the foreign demand is large relative to the home labor force, the
incentive to push smaller ﬁrms out of the market in order to earn higher proﬁts will be
higher. In addition, for those ﬁrms that do export, larger size of the foreign export market
means higher proﬁts, ceteris paribus, and thus more political power at home. We can also
highlight the conditions under which the opposite outcome obtains: the disciplining eﬀect
of trade predominates. When the number of domestic ﬁrms is small vis-a-vis its trading
partner, foreign competition in the domestic market forces even the biggest ﬁrms to want to
improve institutions in order to increase their proﬁts. Thus, when domestic ﬁrms capture a
very small share of the world market under trade, the shift in the Preference Curve is large.
When this is the case, the economy is likely to retain good institutions or even improve
them. This eﬀe c ti sm o r ep r o n o u n c e dw h e nt h eS o u t hi sa l s or e l a t i v e l yl a r g e—t h em i r r o r




k ]; fH = 181; τ =1 .1; fX =1 5 0 ; λ0 =1 ; λ1 =0 .875; f
N =4 8 . Details of numerical
implementation and the MATLAB programs we used are available upon request.
21image of the previous case we analyzed. Figure 9 reports equilibrium trade institutions for
the same grid of parameter values. The darkly shaded area represents all cases under which
institutions deteriorate as a result of trade, while in the lightly shaded area institutions
improve. We can see that the nS/nN dimension matters more than the LS/LN dimension:
institutions always worsen more sharply when raising the latter than the former. We can
also see that when the South’s market power is suﬃciently high, institutions deteriorate
quite sharply.
5 Discussion
What evidence can we provide in support of the claims made in the model? As we saw, trade
opening has an ambiguous eﬀect on institutional quality, but can result in a deterioration
under some circumstances. Since episodes of institutional change are relatively rare, and
systematic data on economic institutions are available for only the last 20-30 years at best,
regression analysis is not a promising way to illustrate our model: quite simply, during the
recent decades, there may not have been any episodes of trade-induced institutional change
that our model is intended to capture. Nonetheless, because institutions are very persistent,
trade opening episodes that occurred farther back in time shaped institutions for decades
if not centuries afterwards, and thus remain relevant. Thus, we will proceed by illustrating
our model with a number of case studies, fully acknowledging the usual caveats that come
with that approach.
We show that the eﬀects illustrated in our model were at work during the sugar boom in
the Caribbean starting in mid-18th century, coﬀee boom in Central and South America in
the 19th, and the cotton and cattle booms in Central America in mid-20th century. These
are cases of abrupt trade opening — as evidenced by sharp increases in volumes — that were
due to conditions largely outside of the exporters’ control. In all three, export markets were
quite large relative to country size, and the aﬀected countries enjoyed large market shares
in their exports — conditions for institutional deterioration identiﬁed by the model. We then
illustrate the Melitz eﬀect: sharp changes in the production structure in favor of a smaller
number of larger producers. We argue that these changes in production structure led to
the political power eﬀect described in our model. Finally we show that the large producers
used their power to bring about a deterioration in institutions.
In connection to the last point, it may be worth highlighting an important caveat. While
we would argue that our model describes the Melitz and the political power eﬀects in these
cases quite precisely, the parameter that captures institutional quality is reduced-form in
22our model. Though we formalize institutions as a ﬁxed cost of production that acts to deter
entry, clearly economic institutions are much more sophisticated objects than that. Thus,
we would like to caution against interpreting our institutional quality parameter too literally
when going to the case studies. That is, when we describe deteriorations in institutional
quality, we necessarily interpret institutions more broadly than ﬁxed entry costs. What
we observe in our case studies are land expropriations, general deteriorations in property
rights, and legal systems partial to those in power. We do ﬁnd clear evidence, however, that
deteriorations in institutions we describe were intended by their designers to increase the
eﬀective entry barriers that small producers face, in order to lower competition and raise
proﬁts for the largest producers.
5.1 Sugar in the Caribbean, 1650-1850
Beginning in the 1650s Barbados, a sugar boom swept most of the Caribbean islands over
a period of 200 years. Pre-sugar Caribbean islands were typically smallholder peasant
societies, farming foodstuﬀs and perhaps tobacco for export. Some were sparsely populated,
though others were quite successful. For instance, settlement in Barbados started in 1641,
and by 1655 it had 10,000 British settlers, resulting in a population density higher than
most regions in England (Rogozinski, 1999, p. 71). By then, all of the island’s arable land
had been distributed to farmers.
When sugar was introduced to the islands, the transformation was typically quite rapid.
In the most extreme cases, land use was given over almost entirely to sugar, so much so
that many islands had to import food. Land ownership consolidation was swift as well,
with islands going from smallholder patterns of land use to giant plantations. For instance,
in 1750s Barbados, 74 families owned 305 out of 536 estates. On Nevis, the number of
plantations went from over a hundred to around thirty a century later. The dominance
of sugar in the Caribbean economies was mirrored in the region’s position as the primary
exporter of sugar in the world. Caribbean produced between 80 and 90 percent of sugar
consumed by western Europeans in the 18th century (Rogozinski, 1999, p. 107). It was also
clear that power was derived from being a planter, and that economic power — the size of
plantation and the resulting proﬁts — was key to political power. For instance, Stinchcombe
(1995) notes that “[plantation] size measures the main causal complex that produced and
maintained slave societies, societies in which the main public good was reliable repression
of all rights of slaves, ... and constraints on the rest of the society deemed necessary to the
security of the slave regime.” (p.89).
23The ﬁnal piece of the argument concerns the way in which planters, once in power,
changed institutions. Clearly, the most signiﬁcant consequence of planter power was the
slavery that was prevalent in the sugar boom Caribbean. At the height of the sugar era, al-
most 9 out of 10 inhabinants of the Caribbean were slaves, a proportion of slaves to the free
never before recorded in human history. The Caribbean slavery system was by all accounts
the most extreme form practiced at the time. However, and more relevant to our model,
planters also went to great lengths to curtail the property rights of the free members of so-
ciety, such as farmers. In plantation economies, all of the land suitable for sugar cultivation
was used for sugar. But even for unsuitable lands, the government policy was to explicitly
discourage cultivation. Stinchcombe (1995) notes that “[t]hroughout most of the colonial
period on most of the sugar islands, the formal government policy was to prevent peasant
cultivation in the highlands, ... since that provided a peasant alternative to plantation la-
bor for freedmen.” (p. 104). This was apparently done at least in part through deliberately
insecure property rights: “[m]any of the tenures on which small holdings have been held
in the Caribbean have been legally precarious. ... The more planters were in control, the
more precarious were peasant tenures, since secure tenures raised the ‘reservation wage’ of
free peasants in the free labor market, and provided a comparison point for slaves before
emancipation” (p. 93). After emancipation, the governments of the islands attempted to
keep the wages low and reduce earnings opportunities outside the plantations by restricting
access to crown lands by either prospective planters or by peasants. (Stinchcombe, 1995, ch.
10). Thus, in the Caribbean we can see the essential outlines of our story. The export boom
brought power to large exporters; those exporters used that power to reduce competition,
in this case in the factor markets.
5.2 Coﬀee in Latin America 1850-1920
Coﬀee production started in the New World during the eighteenth century, and trade in
coﬀee soared from 320 metric tons in 1770 to 90,000 in 1870 and 1.6 million in 1920.
This increase is often attributed to rising demand, which was partly a result of aggressive
marketing campaigns. Coﬀee consumption in the US grew from 3 pounds per person in
1830 to 16 pounds per person in 1960. This explosion of coﬀee consumption in the US and
Europe was associated with a transformation of the economic, social and political landscape
in coﬀee producing countries, especially in Latin America. As noted by Roseberry et al.
(1995), “coﬀee is both a product of ‘free trade’ ideology and practice and the ﬁrst ‘drug food’
not controlled by colonial or imperial trading blocs. For those newly independent countries
24from southern Mexico to southern Brazil with exploitable subtropical soils, coﬀee served as
a principal point of linkage to an expanding world economy, the means by which they could
turn toward an ‘outwardly focused’ model of development.” (p. 10) Thus, we have reasons
to believe that the environment described in our model ﬁts well the conditions of coﬀee
economies: trade as the driving factor behind economic, social, and political change, and
a multitude of independent actors that nonetheless does not result in perfect competition.
W h i l et h e r ea r ei m p o r t a n td i ﬀerences between the Latin American countries that turned
to coﬀee production during the second half of the nineteenth century, they share some
signiﬁcant common patterns to which we now turn.
Increased proﬁtability from coﬀee production induced prices of inputs to rise, leading to
a sharp increase in land prices. Pico (1995) reports that in Roncador, one of Puerto Rico’s
highland regions, the average price of land rose from 3.41 pesos per cuerda in 1863 to 28.14
in 187717 (Table 4.3, p. 106). Consistent with the implications of our theory, increased land
prices came with land ownership concentration: “coﬀee expansion in the Cordillera Central
of Puerto Rico, while it was still a Spanish colony, entailed the progressive concentration
of land ownership to the detriment of small farms in a process that was dominated by
and consolidated the hold of immigrant merchants. (...) Whereas in the 1850s about half
of the population had access to land, by the 1870s, this proportion had declined to 17
percent. Thus, although smallholders predominated numerically, most coﬀee was produced
on large estates.” (Stolcke, 1995, p.73). As expected, concentration of economic power
came hand in hand with concentration of political power, itself used to perpetuate economic
dominance. Analyzing the experience of other coﬀee economies, Roseberry et al. (1995)
note in the introduction to their book: “[g]iven the importance of the coﬀee sector within
Costa Rica, the processors were able to establish themselves as an economic and political
elite (...).” (p. 23) The political power eﬀect was also observed in Brazil: “Here we could
with reason point to the ‘oligarch pacts’ that emerged in the late nineteenth century, the way
in which state policies and practices responded to or ‘expressed’ the needs of the planters
and merchants, and the coﬀee planters who held positions of state power in the various
republics. (...) [A]s Holloway notes, ‘the economic dominance of coﬀee was unquestionable.
Among the property-owning sectors of society the right of the planters to control the political
system was unquestioned, and the mass of working people, slaves, freedmen, native Brazilian
peasants, and immigrants, had no political voice. The government of Sao Paulo was itself
the instrument of the coﬀee planters’ ” (Roseberry et al.,1995, p. 25).
17A cuerda is approximately equivalent to an acre.
25Analyses of social transformation in Latin America and its economic and political origins
have largely focused on labor-related conﬂicts. As the explosion of coﬀee exports pushed
up wages, attempts to secure a source of cheap labor has always been a concern for coﬀee
producers. Direct conﬂicts between landowners and workers in coﬀee economies have re-
ceived a great deal of attention from historians and economists alike (see e.g. De Janvry,
1981).18 Nonetheless, other means were also used to secure the supply of cheap labor. In
particular, another strategy for keeping labor costs down was to reduce competition from
other potential sources of employment, which corresponds to the mechanism we describe
in our model. This was done, for example, by raising “barriers to entry in the form of a
tax in 1903 on new planting” (Greenhill, 1995, p. 192), or through restricting access to
land, as emphasized by Rosewell et al. (1995): “[t]his is not to say that landholders were
powerless and a free market prevailed: the monopolization of land in some regions was the
most eﬀective means for securing a labor force.” (p. 8) Examples of land expropriation
abound. “In Guatemala and El Salvador, (...) the state played a decisive role in creating
the conditions for the development of a coﬀee economy based on large estates. Under the
liberal reforms in Guatemala in the 1870s extensive church lands were conﬁscated and sold
or distributed. In addition, a form of land rent in perpetuity was abolished, with renters
being forced to purchase the land.” (Stolcke, 1995, p. 74). The implication is then imme-
diate: “In El Salvador, the massive and radical expropriation of the indigenous population
and their displacement created a dispossessed population available for seasonal work on the
coﬀee estates.” (Stolcke, 1995, p. 75). This case thus provides a good illustration of the
central point of the paper: property rights (of the indigenous population in this precise
example) were revoked, thus freeing labor for large coﬀee growers.
5.3 Cotton and Beef in Central America, 1950-1980
Cotton production in Central America was minimal until 1950, and exports outside the
region were virtually nil. The combination of a rise in foreign demand following the end
of World War II and improvements in technology produced growth in the cotton sector
that was nothing short of spectacular. The most important technological advance was the
invention of insecticide DDT. Large scale attempts to grow cotton in Central America had
failed in the past because there had been no eﬀective means to combat insects in the area.
18This literature describes exploitation of labor that at times fell just short of outright slavery. Stolcke
(1995) explains that in Guatemala and El Salvador, “in order to ensure and control labor supply a Reglamento
de Jornaleros was passed in the 1870’s which thereafter permitted forcible recruitment of labor from the
indigenous communities, which were subjected, as were resident wage workers, to rigid discipline.” (p. 75).
26That changed dramatically once DDT was invented in 1939.
During the 1940s, all of Central America produced only about 25,000 bales a year, most
of it for textile mills within the region. Central American production exceeded 100,000
bales in 1952, 300,000 in 1955, and 600,000 in 1962. At that time, the region ranked 10th
in the world in cotton production. By mid-1960s, production rose to more than 1 million
bales, and by the late 1970s, Central America as a whole ranked third in the world in cotton
production, below only the United States and Egypt. A key feature of this growth is that
while at the beginning of the period virtually all of the cotton production was consumed
within the region, from 1955 onwards 90% of it was exported outside Central America.
The cotton industry was characterized by signiﬁcant dispersion in ﬁrm size, a prominent
feature of our theory. The average size of a cotton plot over this period was 100 acres.
Across the diﬀerent Central American countries, between 25 and 60% of all growers planted
an average of 5 acres of cotton. The overwhelming majority of land under cotton cultivation
belonged to large producers. For example, in Guatemala, farms with fewer than 122 acres
made up less than 2% of cotton-growing lands, while farms larger than 1100 acres produced
62% of the cotton. The picture is quite similar in other countries. These ﬁgures, however, do
not reveal the full extent of concentration, because often the same family controlled multiple
estates. Available evidence indicates that the large cotton growers were none other than
the established landholding aristocracies in these countries. All in all, these were several
dozen families.
The cotton boom of such proportions naturally involved signiﬁcant growth of the land
area under cotton cultivation. While some of it came from deforestation, another major
source of new cotton lands was through eviction of small farmers. This process came in two
varieties. First, peasants were expelled from lands which were clearly titled to the landlord.
This kind of eviction was usually regarded as benign, and did not produce much overt social
conﬂict. Second, landlords and other prospective cotton growers used their political power
to get titles to the lands previously owned by the national government and municipalities.
According to Williams (1986), “[u]ntitled lands lying near proposed roadways were quickly
titled and brought under the control of cotton growers or others with privileged access to
the land-titling institutions in the capital city.” (p. 56). Once the land was titled in this
manner, peasants cultivating this land were promptly evicted. Some lands were owned by a
municipality and cultivated by the peasants for a nominal fee. This was called the “ejidal”
system, and represented something akin to communal ownership of land by peasants. Since
in this case, the legal status of the lands was more clear than when the lands were untitled,
27more eﬀort was required to expropriate them. Nevertheless, “[w]here ejidal forms came
in the path of the cottonﬁelds, the rights were transferred from municipalities to private
landlords through all sorts of trickery and manipulation.” (Williams, 1986, p. 56).
The takeoﬀ in the beef production and exports followed a path similar to cotton, albeit a
few years later. As of the 1950s, the Central American beef industry was still in a primitive
state, with virtually no export activity. A combination of factors, once again largely outside
Central American control, were behind the beef boom. First, the growth of the fast food
industry in the United States increased demand for the cheaper, grass-fed beef normally
produced in Central America. Second, the United States put in place the so called aftosa
quarantine, in order to prevent hoof and mouth disease from entering North America. As
it happens, the entire South American continent between the Panama Canal and Tierra del
Fuego is subject to the quarantine, but Central America is not. Third, Central America was
given preferential access to the highly protected US market for geopolitical reasons. There
were substantial rents to be had from access to the US market, as the price of beef in the
US was more than double of the world prices.
As a result of these developments, exports of beef soared. The ﬁrst cow was exported
in 1957. In 1960, exports totaled 30 million pounds of boneless beef, in 1973, 180 million
pounds, and in 1978, 250 million pounds. In this period, the size of the Central American
herd grew 250%. More than 90% of Central American beef exports went to the highly
protected US market.
As is the case with cotton, some the biggest beneﬁciaries of the cattle boom were the
established landholding families, who expanded their cattle operations. On the other hand,
smaller ranchers lost livestock in this period. Before the boom, smaller owners held 25% of
the cattle. After the boom, the number of cattle held by small owners decreased by 20%
in absolute terms, and accounted for less than 13% of the total. Thus, the Melitz eﬀect,
according to which the smallest producers don’t survive after trade opening, seems to have
taken place here.
The path of cattle ranching expansion was similar to that of cotton. Forests were
cleared, and peasants were evicted from lands that legally belonged to the would-be cattle
ranching operations. Then, the boom extended into areas that were owned by the national
government or the municipality (ejidal lands). Expulsion of peasants was often done through
violent means, and led to unrest. The large numbers of dispossessed peasants were one of
the factors behind the wave of guerrilla wars and instability that swept through the region
in the 80s.
28In summary, the remarkable growth in export opportunities in the cotton and beef
industries both increased the political power of the largest producers, and provided them
with a strong incentive to push smaller producers out. The result was a deterioration of
institutional quality, evidenced by a wave of land expropriations, consistent with the eﬀect
we are illustrating in our model.
6C o n c l u s i o n
What can we say about how trade opening changes a country’s institutional quality? Coun-
try experiences with trade opening are quite diverse. In some cases, opening led to a di-
versiﬁed economy in which no ﬁrm had the power to subvert institutions, while in others
trade led to the emergence of a small elite of producers, which captured all of the political
inﬂuence and installed the kinds of institutions that maximized their proﬁts. In this paper,
we model the determination of equilibrium institutions in an environment of heterogeneous
producers whose preferences over institutional quality diﬀer. When it comes to the conse-
quences of trade opening, we can separate two eﬀects. First, trade will change each agent’s
preferences over what is the optimal level of institutions. In most cases, though not always,
each ﬁrm will prefer better institutions under trade than in autarky. This is the well-known
disciplining eﬀect of trade.
The second eﬀect, which is central to this paper, is that trade opening shifts political
power towards larger ﬁrms. This is because proﬁts are now more unequally distributed
across ﬁrms, and thus economic and political power is more concentrated in the hands of
few large ﬁrms. This can have an adverse eﬀect on institutional quality, because in our
model large ﬁrms want institutions to be worse.
Which eﬀect prevails depends on the parameter values. A large country that has a small
share of world trade in the rent-bearing good will most likely see its institutions improve
as a result of trade. On the other hand, a small country that captures a large part of the
world market will likely experience a deterioration in institutional quality. Thus, our model
is ﬂexible enough to reﬂect a wide range of country experiences with liberalization, while
revealing the kinds of conditions under which diﬀerent outcomes are most likely to prevail.
29A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
A.1 The Pareto Distribution and the Closed-Form Solutions to the Au-
tarky and Trade Equilibria






The parameter b>0 is the minimum value that this random variable can take, while k
regulates dispersion. (Casella and Berger, 1990, p 628). In this paper we assume that 1/a,
which is labor productivity, has the Pareto distribution. It is straightforward to show that
marginal cost, a, has the following cumulative distribution function:
G(a)=( ba)k, (A.1)
for 0 <a<1/b.I ti sa l s ou s e f u lt od e ﬁne the following integral: V (y) ≡
R y
0 a1−εdG(a).I t
turns out that in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework of monopolistic competition and CES utility,
the integral V (y) is useful for writing the price indices and the total proﬁts in the economy
where the distribution of a is G(a).
Using the functional form for G(a),w ec a nc a l c u l a t eV (a) to be:
V (a)=
bkk
k − (ε − 1)
ak−(ε−1), (A.2)
where we impose the regularity condition that k>ε − 1. When this condition is not
satisﬁed, the total proﬁts in this economy are inﬁnite. Armed with this functional form
assumption, we can characterize the goods market equilibria in autarky and trade.
A.1.1 Autarky Closed-Form Solution
We can use the functional forms of G(a) and V (a) in (A.1) and (A.2) to get the following
expression for the cutoﬀ aA:
aA =
Ã
(1 − α)β(k − (ε − 1))L
nbkk
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A.1.2 Trade Closed-Form Solution




X, ES,a n dEN.
Using these 6 equations and the functional forms for G(a) and V (a), (A.1) and (A.2), we









































































where A, B, C, D, and F are positive constants. It is clear from these expressions that
daS
D
df S < 0 and
daS
X
df S > 0.19
A.2 Regularity conditions on the admissible functions wr (a,f)
1. wr (a,f) is piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to (a,f);
2. For some marginal entrepreneur ar ≤ 1
b and any f ∈ [fL,f H],
∂
∂a
wr (a,f) < 0 if a ≤ ar (A.6)
∂
∂a
wr (a,f) ≤ 0 otherwise (A.7)
That is, wealth is everywhere weakly increasing in ﬁrm productivity, and strictly in-
creasing below a certain well-deﬁned marginal cost cutoﬀ ar.20 We further assume
that: wr (a,f) is twice piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to f; uni-
formly continuous with respect to a;a n d
∂
∂f















wr (a,f) < 0 (A.10)
Conditions (A.8) and (A.9) guarantee that the second-order conditions hold, and
more productive entrepreneurs are less aﬀected by higher levels of entry barriers.
Inequalities (A.10) guarantee existence of an equilibrium.
19Explicit expressions for these constants are available upon request.
20Speciﬁcally, ar is the cutoﬀ above which the ﬁrm does not produce, and thus presumably its wealth need
only be weakly increasing in its productivity.
313. We also impose some technical regularity assumptions regarding the asymptotic be-
havior of the wealth function: there exists a constant γ>0, and two continuously
diﬀerentiable functions γ1 (f),γ2 (f) > 0 and
wr (a,f)=a−γγ1 (f)(1+o(γ2 (f))) (A.11)
This regularity condition implies that the wealth function can be approximated by a
parabolic branch in the neighborhood of 0.21
A.3 From Autarky to Trade
The mechanisms at work in our paper rely on the impact of trade on the distribution of
wealth. Two eﬀects are driving our results: (1) The most productive entrepreneur (a → 0)
is wealthier under the trade regime than he is in autarky, and (2) domestic producers
experience a drop in proﬁts as a consequence of trade (this is the eﬀect analyzed at length
by Melitz, 2003).22







Condition (2) is satisﬁed when for any f ∈ [fL,f H]:





























Let’s also recall two assumptions that have been made to make the model interesting.
The ﬁrst one is the condition that the lowest-productivity entrepreneur does not produce
in autarky, which requires that:
fL >
(1 − α)β [k − (ε − 1)]LS
nSk
£
1 − (1 − α)β ε−1
k
¤ . (A.14)
Condition (A.14) is also suﬃcient for the trade case when (A.13) holds: as producers ex-
perience a drop in proﬁts after trade opening, the lowest-productivity entrepreneur will be
even less willing to produce under trade than in autarky.
Finally, the second condition ensures that the pivotal voter is uniquely deﬁned by its
marginal cost a. A necessary and suﬃcient condition for this to be the case is that the
pivotal voter produces, or ∂
∂awr (a,fH)
¯ ¯
a=p < 0, ∀f ∈ [fL,f H]. As u ﬃcient condition is













which is suﬃcient in autarky as (A.13) holds.
21The notation o(1) in this context indicates that lima→0
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22T h eM e l i t ze ﬀect does not obtain for all parameter conﬁgurations because, unlike Melitz (2003), our
model has asymmetric countries and ﬁxed n
N and n
S. Nonetheless, we can show that the Melitz eﬀect
obtains unambiguously in our model when countries are symmetric.
32A.4 Real Proﬁt Functions
We adopt throughout the paper the convention that wealth is deﬁned by (16) and (17) in
autarky and under trade respectively. In this subsection, we determine suﬃcient conditions
for real proﬁts to verify conditions (A.6) to (A.11).







To see this, we can simply write out the expression for real proﬁts for each entrepreneur,
and check the conditions directly. Equations (3), (5), and (A.3), and the expression for the














Using this expression, we can evaluate the ﬁrst and second partial derivatives to obtain that
as long as (A.16) holds, all the conditions (A.6) — (A.11) are satisﬁed.












D)ε−1a1−ε − fS + fX(aS
X)ε−1a1−ε − fX
PS(f)
for an exporting ﬁrm.
(i) conditions (A.6), (A.7), (A.10) and (A.11) are straightforward to verify.
(ii) condition (A.8) : We ﬁr s tn o t et h a tn o m i n a lp r o ﬁts from domestic production and
exports are concave in f. Second, we note that in order to ensure concavity of the real
proﬁts, we must compare relative concavity of nominal proﬁts and aggregate price with
respect to f. Examining the expression for the price level (A.5),w ec a ns e et h a tb e c a u s e
it ihas exponent
β
1−ε, we can reduce the derivative of price level with respect to f to an
arbitrarily small value as
β
ε−1 → 0. Thus, the concavity of the aggregate price function can
be made as small as necessary.
(iii) For the condition (A.9), the argument is very similar. First, we verify that (A.9)
holds unambiguously for the nominal proﬁts only. Then, we make the argument that the
responsiveness of PS(f) to f can be made arbitrarily small as one decreases
β
ε−1.
We made the argument that the proﬁt-maximising level of f is increasing with ﬁrm
productivity for both domestic and exporting ﬁrms. It remains to check whether this
monotonicity of fT(a) is preserved for those ﬁrms that export at some values of f, but do
not export at other values. Let’s denote fT (a) the level of ﬁxed cost preferred by pivotal
voter a. Consider the following values: f∗∗ (a) = argmaxfS,πS
D(a)>0 πS





X(a,fS).A s g r o s s p r o ﬁts are a concave function of
f, f∗∗ (a) and f∗∗∗ (a) are well-deﬁned and positive. Furthermore, ∂2
∂a∂fSπS
D (a,f) < 0 and
∂2
∂a∂fSπX
D (a,f) < 0 which implies that f∗∗ (.) and f∗∗∗ (.) are nonincreasing functions of a as




D(a,f∗∗∗ (a)) + πS
X(a,f∗∗∗ (a))
¤
which is the diﬀerence of proﬁts for pivotal voter with
productivity level a between domestic production only, and domestic and exports-oriented
production. We have φ(a) ≥ 0 ⇔ fT (a)=f∗∗ (a). The Pareto distribution assumption
implies that φ(a) is continuous and diﬀerentiable in a. A look at the ﬁrst-order conditions
deﬁning f∗∗ (a) and f∗∗∗ (a) shows that for any pivotal voter a, f∗∗ (a) <f ∗∗∗ (a).T o
conclude the proof, we apply the envelope theorem to see that φ0 (a) > 0,a sf∗∗ (a) <






that φ(¯ a)=0 ,t h e n∀a<¯ a, φ(a) > 0 and fT (a)=f∗∗∗ (a),a n d∀a>¯ a, φ(a) < 0 and





. If such value ¯ a does not exist,
then monotonicity holds trivially.¥
Thus, if
β
ε−1 is small enough, real proﬁt functions in autarky and under trade both satisfy
(A.6) to (A.11). The intuition is simple: as nominal proﬁts satisfy (A.6) to (A.11), for real
proﬁts to do the same, it is necessary that aggregate prices (in autarky and under trade) are
not “too concave.” It is easy to see and we will not show it, that there are enough degrees
of freedom in terms of parameter values to make
β
ε−1 suﬃciently small while retaining the
concavity of nominal proﬁt functions.
A detailed treatment of the compatibility of the requirements (concavity of real proﬁt
functions, conditions (A.12) to (A.15)) is computationally involved, and does not present
much interest here. We can intuitively see that we have enough degrees of freedom con-
cerning parameter values for all the restrictions to hold simultaneously. A comprehensive
derivation of suﬃcient conditions for propositions and corollaries to hold is available upon
request.
A.5 Proofs




















































































































































. The second point comes from the observation that wm =
wp (λ0,λ 1) for any λ0 > 0. Finally, the third point is quite intuitive and can be established

















































T h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f(A.17) converges to zero as λ0 grows large, so that limλ0→∞ wp (λ0,λ 1)=
wm.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :The ﬁrst-order conditions imply that such value f is charac-
terized by ∂
∂fwr (p,f)=0 , if the solution is interior. Equation (A.8) implies that when nec-
essary, the ﬁrst-order condition is also suﬃcient and fr (p)=fL i fa n do n l yi f ∂
∂fwr (p,fL) ≥
0 and fr (p)=fH i fa n do n l yi f ∂










∂fwr (p,fH) ≤ 0
o
and f−1








∂fwr (p,fL) ≥ 0
o
. Con-
ditions (A.10) imply that f−1
r (fH) <f −1
r (fL). Finally, regularity assumptions imply that
fr (p) is piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to p.












ditions imply that we can diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to f and p,
while (A.8) and (A.9) imply that fr (p) is nonincreasing, so that when it is diﬀerentiable,
f0
r (p) ≤ 0. Furthermore, the ﬁr s tp a r to f(A.10) ensures that for levels of p = a small
enough, the solution is interior, and thus for some range of p’s the Preference Curve is
strictly decreasing.¥
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 :See discussion and derivation of conditions on parameter values
in section A.4 above.¥
35P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :To prove the ﬁrst part, note that as wr (a,f) is nondecreasing,
the left-hand side of (19) is increasing and continuous in p, thus there exists a unique pr (f)
that satisﬁes (19). We now need to verify that pr (f) corresponds to the pivotal voter with




























Given conditions (A.6), (A.7) and the condition that ∂
∂awr (a,f)
¯ ¯
a=p < 0, the transforma-
tion a → w = wr (a,f) is strictly monotonic for a ≤ p. We can hence change the variables















By uniqueness of the pivotal voter deﬁned by (15), we conclude that wr (pr (f),f)=wp.














is well-deﬁned as wr (a,f) is piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable, which implies that pr (f)
is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to f.
To prove the second part, we ﬁrst state the following Lemma:
Lemma 13 If pr (f|λ0,λ) is the marginal cost of production of the pivotal voter that prevails
when entry barriers are equal to f and political weights are given by λ(w)=λ0 +wλ1,t h e n
• pr (f|λ0,λ 1) is decreasing in λ1 and increasing in λ0
• pr (f|λ0,λ 1) ≥ pm for any λ0 > 0,λ 1 ≥ 0 and f ∈ [fL,f H]
• limλ0→∞ pr (f|λ0,λ 1)=pm for any λ0 > 0,λ 1 ≥ 0 and f ∈ [fL,f H]
Furthermore, if w(a,f) satisﬁes (A.11), then in order to ensure that the integral for the







dG(a) < ∞,i tm u s tb et h e
case that λ1 <k / γ . ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 3 :The ﬁrst three points are immediate consequences of Lemma 1,
and given that there is a one-to-one decreasing correspondence between wealth levels and
marginal costs of production. Finally, the Pareto distribution with parameter k assumption
implies that the integral
R +∞
0 a−λ1γdG(a) converges if and only if λ1γ<k . ¥
Returning to the proof, diﬀerentiating equation (19) implicitly with respect to f,w e






















36The sign of p0

















r (f), the entrepreneur who would prefer f.T h e ﬁrst-order conditions
imply that
∂wr(a,f)
∂f > 0 i fa n do n l yi fa<f −1
r (f).
There are two cases:
• If f−1

























































































, so that we can restrict ourselves to




























37Condition (A.11) implies that
∂ lnwr(a,f)














∂f is bounded above uniformly with respect to a so that there exist v>0
such that
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¯
. (A.19)
If the political weight function is “convex enough,” then (A.19) eventually holds as more
political weight is moved towards lower marginal cost entrepreneurs. To see this, let’s con-
sider λ0
0 > 0,λ 0
1 > 0, and consider the following inequality, where we change the parameters
















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Then, as (A.11) holds, there exists a threshold ¯ λ1 < k
γ, such that for any λ0
1 > ¯ λ1,
(A.19) holds. Actually, the integral
R ˜ pr(f)
0 a−λ0
1γdG(a) diverges as λ0
1γ converges to k.





> 0 such that for any λ0












≥ ˜ pr (f). We can thus conclude that there exists ¯ λ1 < k
γ such that for any
λ0





> 0 such that for any λ0





, (A.19) holds for the
economy characterized by a political weight function λ(w)=λ0
0 + wλ0
1. To conclude the
argument, we remark that f ∈ [fL,f H] is a compact set, so that the intersection of all the
constraints is non-empty. We have hence identiﬁed a set of parameters characterizing the
political weight function for which the Political Curve is downward sloping.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :If pr (fH) ≤ f−1
r (fH),t h e n(fH,p r (fH)) is one such point.
Symmetrically, if pr (fL) ≥ f−1
r (fL),t h e n(fL,p r (fL)) is one such point. Otherwise, by
continuity, there exists f ∈ (fL,f H) such that pr (f)=f−1
r (f), so that the political and
preference curves intersect in (f,pr (f)).¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 : There exists an equilibrium. We prove stability by ﬁrst
stating two Lemmas, one that rules out cycling equilibria, and another that shows corner
solution equilibria to be stable.¥
Lemma (no cycling): The functions Φr (.) and Πr (.) are increasing so that for any





, the sequences {Φn
r (f)}n≥1 and {Πn
r (f)}n≥1 are monotonic.
Proof: fr (.) and pr (.) are both decreasing functions, so that Φr (.) and Πr (.) are increasing.¥
The previous lemma shows that there is no cycling possible. The sequences {Φn
r (f)}n≥1 and
{Πn
r (f)}n≥1 are monotonic and are bounded, so that they converge. Either they converge
to an interior solution, and such solution is stable, or they converge to the boundaries. The
latter case is addressed below:
Lemma (corner solutions): If the political curve intersects the preference curve in either
38fL or fH, then the resulting equilibrium is stable.¥
Proof: Let’s consider (fH,p r (fr)) such intersection point. A corner solution is thus char-
acterized by pr (fH) <f −1
r (fH).W eh e n c es e tρ = 1
2
¯ ¯pr (fH) − f−1
r (fH)
¯ ¯. Then take any
˜ p ∈ (pr (fH) − ρ;pr (fH)+ρ). ˜ p<f −1
r (fH) so that fr (˜ p)=fH,a n dpr [fr (˜ p)] = pr (fH).
Convergence to (fH,p r (fH)) occurs after the ﬁrst loop: Π(˜ p)=pr (fH). The same argu-
ment holds for an intersection of the type (fL,p r (fL)).¥
Coming back to the proof of the main theorem, if there exists a corner-solution equilibrium,
the previous lemma showed that such candidate is stable. Otherwise, suppose that such
equilibrium is an interior equilibrium. The Lemma above shows that it is not a cycling one.
The absence of corner solutions implies that pA (fH) >f −1
A (fH),w h i l epA (fL) <f −1
A (fL).
The intersection of the Political and Preference curves is such that the Political curve needs
to be downward sloping at the intersection, so that f−1
A (fH) <f −1
A (fL). If there are two
intersections, then one is a stable equilibrium. Suppose now that there is only one in-
tersection (f,pA (f)),w i t hf ∈ (fL,f H) and let’s compare the slopes of the Political and






¢0 (f) if and only if pA (fL) <f −1






(f,pA (f)) is a stable equilibrium. Otherwise, we are in the presence of a kink in f for either
or both curves, and the same argument holds: lim ˜ f→f−
pA( ˜ f)−pA(f)
˜ f−f < lim ˜ f→f−
f−1
A ( ˜ f)−f−1
A (f)
˜ f−f
i fa n do n l yi fpA (fL) <f −1
A (fL),a n dlim ˜ f→f+
pA( ˜ f)−pA(f)
˜ f−f < lim ˜ f→f+
f
−1




a n do n l yi fpA (fH) >f −1
A (fH) so that lim ˜ f→f−
pA( ˜ f)−pA(f)
˜ f−f < lim ˜ f→f−
f−1





˜ f−f < lim ˜ f→f+
f
−1
A ( ˜ f)−f
−1
A (f)
˜ f−f : (f,pA (f)) is a stable equilibrium.¥
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y9 : See discusion on the real proﬁt functions in the section A.4
above.¥








[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a)
The pivotal voter shifts to the left, that is, pT(f) <p A(f) i fa n do n l yi f∆ > 0.C o n s i d e r
the entrepreneur whose proﬁts in autarky are the same as under trade, and denote that
entrepreneur by ¯ a(f). There are two possibilities, i) ¯ a(f) <p A(f),a n di i )¯ a(f) <p A(f).
We consider each in turn.













[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a)
The last term is unambiguously positive. Therefore, the suﬃcient condition for ∆ > 0 is:
Z ¯ a(f)
0
[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a) >
Z pA(f)
¯ a(f)
−[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a)




[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a) −
Z ¯ a(f)
pA(f)




[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a)
The last term is unambiguously positive. Therefore, the suﬃcient condition for ∆ > 0 is:
Z pA(f)
0
[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a) >
Z ¯ a(f)
pA(f)
[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a)
Let’s now consider ˜ pA (f)=m i n {pA (f),¯ a(f)}, so that we can restrict ourselves to the
following unique suﬃcient condition:
Z ˜ pA(f)
0
[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a) >
Z ¯ a(f)
pA(f)
[λ(wT (a,f)) − λ(wT (a,f))]dG(a)


















































When this is true, the term in brackets on the left hand side does not go to zero as a → 0.W e
know that πA(a)=faε−1
A a1−ε −f, πD(a)=faε−1
D a1−ε −f and πX(a)=fXaε−1
X a1−ε −fX.








A a1−ε − f
faε−1
D a1−ε − f + fXaε−1








as assumed in (A.12).F o r e a c h f,c o n s i d e rλ0
0 > 0, λ0
1 ≥ 0 and the following inequality,


























The integral on the right hand side is bounded from above. Then, as (A.11) holds, there
exists a threshold ¯ λ1 < k
γ, such that for any λ0
1 > ¯ λ1, (A.21) holds. Actually, the integral
R ˜ pr(f)
0 a−λ0
1γdG(a) diverges as λ0






> 0 such that for any λ0











≥ ˜ pA (f). We can thus
conclude that there exists ¯ λ1 < k
γ such that for any λ0






such that for any λ0





, (A.20) holds for the economy characterized by a political
weight function λ(w)=λ0
0 + wλ0
1. To conclude the argument, we remark that f ∈ [fL,f H]
is a compact set, so that the intersection of all the constraints is non-empty. We have
hence identiﬁed a set of parameters characterizing the political weight function for which
the Pivotal Voter curves unambiguously moves inward as a consequence of trade.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2 :Note that for any entry barrier level f, fr [Πn (pr (f))] =
Φn+1 (f),a n dpr [Φn (fr (p))] = Πn+1 (p),s ot h a tb yc o n t i n u i t yo ffr (.) and pr (.),t h et w o
requirements (22) and (23) are redundant. We will thus restrict ourselves to condition (22).
f−1
T (fA) is the pivotal voter who prefers fA under the trade regime. Since f−1
T (fA) >





> ΠT [pT (fA)] as ΠT (.) is the combination of two





= pT (fA).T h u s ,
we have pT (fA) > ΠT [pT (fA)]. Applying ΠT (.) sequentially, for any n>1,
pT (fA) > ΠT [pT (fA)] > Π2
T [pT (fA)]... ≥ Πn
T [pT (fA)]
Taking the limit, and deﬁning pT =l i m n→∞ Πn
T [pT (fA)] and fT =l i m n→∞ Φn (fA), fA
belongs to the basin of attraction of (fT,p T) and the inequality above implies that fA <f T.¥
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Figure 1: Profits as a Function of Marginal Cost
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Figure 2: Profits and Firms’ Segmentation into Domestic and 
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Figure 3: Profits as a Function of Marginal Cost for Two Different 
Values of f
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Figure 5: Densities of Distributions of Profits and the Pivotal Firms 
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Figure 8: Ranges of Parameter Values Such that Institutions 





















Figure 9: Institutions under trade as a Function of Parameter Values
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